Abstract: This article disputes the recent argument of Dimitry Kochenov advocating an 'EU Citizenship without Duties'. His thesis rests on an untenable form of philosophical anarchism that overlooks the role played by our political obligations to state structures in securing rights. At best, his argument suggests a 'thin' form of EU citizenship that allows European citizens to choose which of the Member States they wish to become morally obliged to. A 'thicker' form of EU level citizenship could only arise by creating civic obligations at the EU level, the position he rejects. To the extent certain Court of Justice judgments in this area reflect parallel reasoning to Kochenov's, they too suffer from a similar failure to appreciate the role of civic duties to particular Member States (or eventually the EU) in creating and securing the status of citizens as equal rights bearers.
increasingly become the exception rather than the rule within most democratic states. 3 For example, he maintains that only a few countries regard the right to vote as entailing a duty to vote, or the right to security as involving a duty of national service, not just in time of war but also in peacetime. 4 In this respect, he contends EU citizenship merely follows a more general trend. However, he extends this empirical observation to make a much broader argument of a normative nature. He adopts a philosophical anarchist position that denies any non-voluntary political obligation to obey the law, either in general or with regard to a particular state. 5 He suggests that rights are best conceived as moral claims that every individual may make against all other individuals and that we ought to respect only to the extent justice requires us to do so. 6 The compatibility of existing laws or states with such moral rights justify any legitimate duties we may have to them, regardless of whether we are citizens or not. 7 Indeed, he implies in Section III that the mutual recognition of these rights by all individuals alone suffices to coordinate human behaviour, taking us beyond the need for any political organisation that might have the coercive characteristics associated with states. 8 In Section IV he applies the argument to EU citizenship and 3 , 485-91 4 , 483 5 The most sophisticated modern account of this position, which I will use below to fill out gaps in Kochenov's argument, is that of A. J. reason is as follows: Kochenov's argument requires for its coherence both that all activities requiring coordination and cooperation can be based on uncoerced choice, and that no major conflicts or disagreements exist between rival rights claims. Yet, the need for authoritative coordination and cooperation can be regarded as arising from the 'circumstances of justice' that lead to the need for rights in the first place, while the presence of conflicts and disagreements about these rights form the 'circumstances of politics' within which rival claims need to be reconciled. Taken together, I shall contend that these two circumstances generate a rights-based reason to respect the need for political obligations in general and to obey and participate within a given state in particular.
The rest of this section addresses the general argument, the next section the particular argument and its relationship to the 'circumstances of citizenship' -including EU Citizenship.
Consider first the 'circumstances of justice'. Following Hume and Rawls, 13 these circumstances can be attributed to scarcity, limited altruism and limited knowledge and power. If a superabundance of goods existed, all persons possessed an angelic disposition and, the road to hell being paved with good intentions, everyone could always second-guess each other's actions and had the ability to achieve whatever they wished, then there would be no need for rights. 14 In this idyllic Land of Cockaigne, rights would be superfluous. Its well provided for, pure and altruistic, omniscient and omnipotent inhabitants would have no need to make claims against each other. All could freely choose to act in whatever way they desired and, where necessary, would be able to spontaneously coordinate and cooperate with each other in ways that would always be mutually fulfilling and virtuous. In the absence of these conditions, there will always be competing and disputed claims on scarce goods and a need to settle them justly by deciding who is entitled to what.
To secure certain freedoms -even something as mundane as driving through a busy town -will often require coordinating and cooperating with others, given that a complex road system and an urban environment will not appear without a degree of conscious planning. As in Feinberg's imagined world of 'Nowheresville', 15 much might be achieved by people being sensitive to others and dutifully acting on the obligations of some agreed moral code, although the limits of human practical reasoning would almost certainly still lead to some conflicts. However, in this situation individuals would be unable to claim as a right that they could drive at a given moment, such as when there was a green light, or build a house on the land they had bought for the purpose, have privacy or exercise free speech and so forth. They would always be dependent on others possessing sufficient good will and sensitivity to their needs to allow them to do so.
To be able to claim a right without relying on the forbearance or virtue of others requires that it can be enforced even when these others oppose or simply neglect to uphold it. In other words, it requires that others can be obliged to recognise that right. The 'circumstances of politics' enter at this point. 16 These circumstances derive from the need for a political authority to regulate people's behaviour in ways that protect their rights, if need be through coercion, and that can do so legitimately, despite these same people often disagreeing about the nature and basis of their rights and the most appropriate and justified forms of regulation and coercion. Of course, though a coercive political authority might be a condition of justice that does not mean that any given political authority is just. The second political aspect of rights emerges here. If justice is itself controversial we cannot appeal to it as an independent standard for adjudicating on the legitimacy of the various political arrangements that serve to instantiate it. Rather, we will need some form of political mechanism for claiming and defining our rights in a free and equal way against and with others. What might be called the 'circumstances of citizenship' arise at this point.
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III The Circumstances of Citizenship and EU Citizenship
The 'circumstances of citizenship' consist of the existing world of bounded polities within which issues of political membership arise. A wide variety of principles for deciding this issue exist both empirically and normatively. Here I focus on two accounts pertinent to the current discussion: what I shall call the 'choice' account and the 'civic' account.
The choice account involves the importance of our being able to choose which political community we belong to. Though at times Kochenov appears to deny the need for any political authority at all, 23 at others he seems to accept, as most philosophical anarchists do, 24 that some political authority might be needed. However, like them he argues its legitimacy depends on its being freely chosen by those subject to it. States, could be related to a general obligation to maintain the fiscal viability of States by preventing citizens simply shopping around at whim to the extent that no stable political communities would be possible.
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The philosophical anarchist account also suggests it would be inadvisable that the EU displaced the Member States to become itself a political community capable of exacting duties. For that would necessarily prevent citizens from choosing between the Member States.
It is perhaps indicative of the ambivalences and ambiguities of Kochenov's argument that it is unclear how far he would welcome this conclusion. The key problem confronting him, though, is that on this line of reasoning he can only avoid associating EU Citizenship with many duties because these remain largely linked to our membership of whichever Member State we choose. What EU Citizenship adds is a presumption that to the extent we can freely move between these States, then our obligations towards them are chosen and so legitimate.
The most obvious difficulty with this account is that most individuals are sedentary and therefore exercise no choice. Only 2.75% of the EU population -roughly 14 million people -currently reside on a stable basis in a Member State other than their own. 33 Indeed, the choice account relies on this being the case. For the stable citizenship regimes of the Member States create the choices the free moving EU Citizens choose between. By contrast, the civic account for ensuring the legitimacy of the political authority applies even to those who have not moved or chosen their civic status but have rather acquired citizenship through birth. This account rests on the political authority being under the free and equal 32 Arguably the Court of Justice has come to close to committing this error not only by not allowing the fiscal viability of public services such as health and education to be a consideration in restricting access to them, as in the Cases cited in n. 31, but also by treating national rules against tax avoidance as violations of free capital movement, on which see S. Ganghof, and P. Genschel 15(1): (2008a), 'Taxation and Democracy in the EU', Journal of European Public Policy, 58 33 EC Press release 15 January 2014http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-9_en.htm democratic control of those subject to it. The civic account is sometimes given a libertarian reading as suggesting that political authority is thereby subjected to the consent of citizens, and hence comes close to being something they have chosen. Yet, as the philosophical anarchist R. P.
Wolff established some years ago, it is practically impossible for even the most direct form of democracy to provide a satisfactory method for citizens to consent. 34 A more realistic view suggests that we have an obligation to participate with others in collectively determining on a free and equal basis the system of rights under which we happen to live. In this respect, being born into a given political community can be likened to finding oneself already a member of the local Bach choir, the members depending on you to do your bit in bringing about the collective performance that is a fair and equitable system of laws. That need not tie you forever to a given community anymore than one must remain a member of a given choir but, contra Kochenov, it constrains your freedom to flit from one to another at whim without any obligations whatsoever. 36 
